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RECONSTITUTION:
A Strategic Policy Assessment
With Case Application of the Maritime Patrol Force

by

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
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The Maritime Patrol Aviation warfare community of the United States Navy is used as a case study to examine and expose the effects of a reconstitution strategy implied, but perhaps not fully understood. An emphasis is placed on reconstitution as a potentially required process initiated for events short of war, and its relationship to gradual mobilization response.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT	ii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	iv
LIST OF TABLES	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	i
I. INTRODUCTION	1
2005: Do You Know Where Your Forces Are?	4
Preparing to Fight the Next War	6
II. RECONSTITUTION — NOTHING NEW?	7
Standing Military Force and American Tradition	8
Analysis of Reconstitution in Two Prior Wars	11
Fiscal Response and Responsibility	20
III. A DECONSTRUCTION OF RECONSTITUTION	24
A Strategy/Policy Assessment	26
Reconstitution Assessed	28
Elements of Reconstitution	30
The Philosophy of Reconstitution	35
Gradual Mobilization Response	41
Policy Assessment Summary	50
IV. ECONOMICS AND DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION DYNAMICS	52
Force Planning	53
Force Programming	56
Force Budgeting	59
Gradual Mobilization and the Base Force	60
V. MARITIME PATROL: A CASE STUDY	65
United States Navy Maritime Patrol	68
Case Summary	82
VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS	84
Recommendations	86
APPENDIX 1: DYNAMICS OF FORCE REDUCTION & RECONSTITUTION	89
BIBLIOGRAPHY	
DISTRIBUTION	

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. Strategic Ends Versus Means	27
2. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System	52
3. Aircraft Inventory Options	73
4. MPA Manpower Inventory Projection for Year 2000	77
5. Maritime Patrol Forward Basing (Deployment Sites)	80

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Military Growth Prior to World War II	21
2. Waiting Time for Aircraft Components	35

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMARC	Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
BER	beyond economical repair
CINC	commander in chief
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	Continental United States
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DoD	Department of Defense
GMR	Gradual Mobilization Response
GNP	Gross National Product
IBR	Investment Balance Review
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JROC	Joint Resources Oversight Council
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aviation
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
NCA	National Command Authority
NFO	Naval Flight Officer

NMS	National Military Strategy
OPLAN	Operational plan in complete format
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
RGS	Requirements Generation System
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SLEP	Service Life Extension Program
SURTASS	Surface Towed Acoustic Surveillance Ships
SRP	Sustained Readiness Program
VCJCS	Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A Fiscal Year 1995 budget resolution agreed to on May 4, 1994, by House and Senate negotiators ordered a \$13 billion cut in federal spending over the next five years.¹ The resolution reflected revised Congressional Budget Office economic estimates and represented fiscal guidance for all budgetary planners, including those in the Department of Defense (DoD). The resolution did not define exactly where the \$13 billion would come from, but at least half of money, and perhaps as much as three-quarters, was expected to come from the Pentagon's \$1.3 trillion five-year budget.

Concurrently, as the defense budget review and assessment cycle continued, the DoD comptroller revised the 1995 basic budgetary guidance and directed the services to cut their budget estimate submissions substantially as a result. This process, though routine within the larger framework of force structure planning, exacerbated the negative impact of prior overall defense cuts. As a result, military planners were required to modify

¹Thomas E. Ricks, "A Post-Cold War Plan Maps a Smaller But Ready Force," Wall Street Journal, 5 May 1994, A:12.

programming decisions to reflect the expected new fiscal constraints. Routine? - yes. Simple and inconsequential? - no.

Adding to complexities for DoD budgeteers dealing with the directed reductions described above is the quick manner in which savings must be identified. Often, after no more than two or three days of short-fused analysis, decisions are made that dramatically effect programs that have otherwise evolved from an exceptionally complex, integrated and systematically collective series of decisions. The annual budget cycle is meant to conclude with a comprehensive process that includes programmatic reasoning, carefully defined force structure guidance, and national military strategies that were introduced, in some cases, years earlier.

Yet, some budgetary decisions made under demanding time constraints have tended to eliminate important programs (a vertical cut) or large parts of programs (a horizontal cut) in what can be described as sweeping reductions. "Sacred cows," "rice bowls," and expedient "statistical manipulation" often result in corrupting the budgetary cycle, whereby some unworthy programs are saved or only marginally effected while others are axed or severely reduced. Unfortunately, adverse long term consequences from these seemingly instant and disconnected decisions, are often experienced. Although there are review steps in place designed to catch budgetary, programmatic and strategic mismatches, they often prove inadequate under the pressure of

short-fused budget cutting. Usually, only the biggest programs are thoroughly analyzed.

As a result, the efficacy or cohesiveness of the overall force structure plan is contingent on each decision and can, over time, be effectively annulled. This has broad but significant implications for some of the most fundamental tenets of our national security strategy. Perhaps the most subversive effect is on a strategic tenet that has been a stated pillar of our military strategy: *reconstitution*.

*Reconstitution is the ability to generate wholly new forces beyond the crisis response capabilities provided by active and reserve forces to hedge against renewed world threats.*¹ The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of the viability and credibility of reconstitution and its subset requirements (from the National Command Authority (NCA) to the lowest level in military force structure decision making). At the highest levels of strategic thinking, reconstitution is a major and underlying issue that drives policy guidance. But, research seems to indicate that the requirements necessary to sustain a reconstitution capability are not understood well at any level.

Defense resource allocation decisions to meet fiscal year budgetary economic adjustments may very likely have an profound influence on our ability to reconstitute forces for the next major conflict. Furthermore, as the United States continues to reshape

¹ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, p. 29.

its force, planners may find it will require the ability to 'buy back' the potential capabilities of some forces it once thought were duplicative or near obsolescence. One warfare community which exemplifies each of these points, and stresses many of the tenets of a credible reconstitution strategy is the Navy's Maritime Patrol Aviation (MPA).

MPA is currently comprised of twenty land based squadrons and employs the Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft. Its primary mission is anti-submarine warfare and, as this threat is currently reduced, is envisioned as a weapon system that is part of an overall reconstitution strategy. As such, MPA serves as a case study to examine a military capability that requires careful integration with the strategy of reconstitution to be effective in the support of future military requirements.

2005: Do You Know Where Your Forces Are?

It is the year 2005. The international security environment remains dynamic and confusing though major conflict has not yet erupted in any region. The United States is on the brink of multi-regional war. In an assessment of military options, it is found that we cannot accomplish some of the necessary missions that just fifteen years ago, we had globally dominated. For example, anti-submarine warfare, medium range conventional bombing, and short-haul heavy transport can not be done.

Ironically, tenets of the national military strategy of 1992 were right. If we cut certain forces that we could later re-generate so as to afford others, we could better posture ourselves to be ready, capable and modernized for multiple contingencies. Yet we forgot to sustain the elements of our force structure that would keep reconstitution viable.

We, as force planners failed to maintain the discipline to remain programmatically consistent over time. We failed to understand and manage the deceptively difficult process of sustaining a reconstitution capability even though we knew we would require those forces and abilities again. Worse yet, we adopted a glossy overview of history and assumed, since we had done it before, *we could always reconstitute forces if we really needed to.*

Instead, assets and resources were singularly devoted to weapon systems had obvious continuing required demand, or to 'big ticket' acquisitions that reached across multi-congressional districts, or to fundamentally required major war winners. Other important but less essential programs and weapon systems were systematically down-sized due to a myriad of pressures placed decision makers. It was unforeseen that some of those assets cut were those that were highly sensitive to capital investment, stable production orders, broad and varied manpower pipeline limitations, as well as long lead time for developmental training tracks. Though well meaning military planners would cut only one

link of a resource's reconstitution requirement, they would unknowingly undermine a total reconstitution capability.

Now we know that the specifics of modernized warfare, operator proficiency and industrial complexities needed to be nurtured, planned and provided for if reconstitution is to succeed. The enemy figured this out before we did, and the very threats we face today, in 2005, are those which we do not have the capability to counter – because we thought we would and could reconstitute forces.

Preparing to Fight the Next War

The value of this research is to explore whether weaknesses exist to a strategy that executed poorly could severely limit our national security options in the next war and in future operations short of war. These issues are more dramatic given the evolution of technology and warfare. The data shows that force structure decisions at all levels in the resource acquisition and management process have a serious impact on industry, manpower management and the perishability of skills and the mobilization mechanisms each a weapon systems and its associated warfare community employs to meet required surges or long term sustainment. To understand and manage the requirements of reconstitution is to force a distinct coherency throughout military force structure and operational planning systems. This is the goal of this research.

CHAPTER II

RECONSTITUTION -- NOTHING NEW?

The requirement for nations to reconstitute forces is not new. Throughout history, armies from many nations have expanded to meet the requirements of war. While in every case, reconstitution was at some level achieved, a more detailed analysis shows historical examples fraught with process disasters, gross inefficiencies, and ineffectual early results. It can be argued that a nation's security is much more closely tied to its ability to withstand early losses [due to a poor reconstitution process], and its capacity to sustain a reconstitution effort through those early losses, until battlefield victories can be achieved. Is this paradigm inevitable? Can a cost-benefit model be applied to forecast tradeoffs, exhort aggressive planning, and help decisions makers sustain complex policies where the return on investment is less than tangible in the short run? Places and names such as *First Bull Run*, *San Juan Hill*, and *Task Force Smith* should not be forgotten for the losses the United States suffered in not being prepared.

Standing Military Force and American Tradition

Past force planning decisions regarding reconstitution have reflected the dichotomy between maintaining a strong, ready and reconstitutable force and a traditional American opposition to large standing forces. As the United States wrestled to ratify its own constitution, it was a held-over belief that a standing army represented a distinct danger to the liberties of its own people, and would "*subvert the forms of the government, under whose authority they are raised, and establish one [rule] according to the pleasure of their leaders.*"² Additionally, it was feared that standing forces would tempt leaders to become involved in scenarios where vital national interests would not be at stake (perhaps later exemplified in the Vietnam war).

Directly in response to these fears, the Articles of Confederation prior to the Constitution stated that no body of forces "*shall be kept up by any state, in time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgment of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forces necessary for the defense of such state.*"³ Though the Revolutionary War had painfully convinced many people of the inadequacy of the colonial militia, the fear of a professional

²Brutus (pseudonym), "Objections to a Standing Army (Part II)," Anti-Federalist No.25, quoted in Morten Borden, The Anti-Federalist Papers, (Michigan State University Press 1965), 66.

³Ibid.

standing army in time of peace was rooted deep in the experience of Americans. Even when faced with an external threat, early Americans distrusted regular forces:

"The advocates for this power further urge that it is necessary, because it may, and probably will happen, that circumstances will render it requisite to raise an army to be prepared to repel attacks of an enemy, before a formal declaration of war, which in modern times has fallen into disuse. If the constitution prohibited the raising an army, until a war actually commenced, it would deprive the government of the power of providing for the defense of the country, until the enemy were within our territory. If the restriction is not to extend to the raising armies in cases of emergencies, but only to the keeping them up, this would leave the matter to the discretion of the legislature, and they might, under the pretense that there was danger of an invasion, keep up the army as long as they judged proper - and hence it is inferred, that the legislature should have authority to raise and keep up an army without any restriction."⁴

These fears persisted in the debate for the new constitution and led to further amplification:

"It is also admitted that an absolute prohibition against raising troops, except in cases of actual war, would be improper; because it will be requisite to raise and support a small number of troops to garrison the important frontier posts, and to guard arsenals; and it may happen, that the danger of an attack from a foreign power may be so imminent, as to render it highly proper we should raise an army, in order to be prepared to resist them. But to raise and keep up forces for such purposes and such occasions, is not included in the idea of keeping up standing armies in times of peace."⁵

⁴Ibid., p. 67.

⁵Ibid.

Statements and arguments made during the ratification process of the Constitution would, though not eventually adopted, influence the framers and remain relevant in the minds of the new America. The Anti-Federalists went further and proposed the following clause:

"As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and have often been the means of overturning the constitutions of the best governments, no standing army, or troops of any description whatsoever, shall be raised or kept up by the legislature, except so many as shall be necessary for guards to the arsenals of the United States , or for garrisons to such posts on the frontiers...unless when the United States is threatened with an attack or invasion from some foreign power...provided that no troops whatsoever shall be raised in time of peace, without the assent of two thirds of the members, composing both houses of the legislature."⁶

As these quotes illustrate, the fear of a standing military force was significant and lasting among the founders of the United States . Though the final ratified version of the Constitution was more visionary, elements of these sentiments are still contained within the context and wording, and are worth reviewing: *The Congress shall have the power: to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide for*

⁶Ibid.

organizing, arming and disciplining the militia... [Article 1: Section 8].

Historically, when Congress has been convinced that an emergency existed, it has reacted swiftly and exercised good judgment. Yet prior to actually conflict, Congress has historically poorly prepared the nation and instead relied heavily on the military's ability to absorb the first 'blow' and regenerate forces. That said, managing a reconstitution effort is complex. There are three foundations of reconstitution that can be reviewed and examined in historical context to assess reconstitution effectiveness: (1) the management of warning time; (2) the management of personnel; and (3) the management of the defense industry required to produce weapon systems.

A brief analysis of two historic reconstitution efforts will illustrate the America's ability in the past to reconstitute forces and how effective those efforts were in the short and long runs. Additionally, the nation's military fiscal policy is interrelated and can be assessed in historical context to provide further insights to a reconstitution capability.

An Analysis of Reconstitution in Two Prior Wars

Under close scrutiny, the recent history of reconstitution in the United States is not as encouraging as one might assume based on ultimate results in war. A 1955 Department of the Army study of seven prior American reconstitution and mobilization

efforts emphatically concluded that the United States "has never adequately and fully planned for a mobilization before [war] occurred."⁷ Interestingly, the reconstitution effort undertaken in 1938-1942 prior to World War II is often referred to today as a successful example based on the state of the forces prior to the war as compared to the war's ultimate outcome. Yet, a detailed analysis shows that this evaluation of reconstitution is misleading.

World War II. A study of World War II offers some obvious parallels and contradictions. World War II represented more of a "worst case" scenario for reconstitution. American resources were stretched to fight a truly global contest and fully divided into Pacific and Atlantic forces.

The unpopular peace settlement following World War I led to pervasive isolationist policies that moved to unilaterally downsize all military force levels dramatically. Even still, as forces were assessed entering war in 1941, the United States still had retained several major weapon systems and could compete relatively favorably in those areas (e.g., battleships and aircraft carriers). However, two military capabilities were notably unprepared in spite of what was then obvious warning signals: the land power of United States Army and anti-submarine warfare.

⁷Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, "DA Pamphlet 20-212: History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945," Department of the Army, November 1955, (U.S. Government Printing Office), 695.

In 1939, the United States Army was ranked seventeenth globally in terms of manpower numbers and could be described qualitatively as very understrength and obsolete.⁸ Broken down into its two major components, the Regular Army approached 210 thousand enlisted and the National Guard stood at slightly below 200 thousand. Legislation at the time authorized 280 thousand and 450 thousand men respectively, but Congress declined to vote the appropriations to field the full authorized strength.⁹ As Hitler swept through Europe between 1939 and 1941, many key figures in Washington, such as Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring, remained isolationist and consistently led efforts to limit increases in military strength and massive modernization. By the summer of 1941, Nazi forces were advancing on Leningrad and Moscow.

Warning of the deteriorating situation faced by the United States in the Atlantic sea lanes was seen in early 1939. German U-boats had commenced unrestricted submarine warfare in earnest and British shipping losses rose steadily.¹⁰ Shipping convoys from America became routine but were supported by too few destroyer escorts to allay shipping losses. In the United States, very few

⁸Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II, (New York: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co., 1965), 131.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Perhaps the clearest signal of escalation was Hitler's repudiation of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement on April 26, 1939, which quite plainly indicated that the policy of trying to reach agreement with Britain had been abandoned. Germany immediately initiated an accelerated rearmament program.

destroyers had been retained from the previous war and the industrial capacity to rebuild new ships had decayed. Despite the loan of 50 destroyers from the America, British commentators described their ocean escort situation as deplorable.¹¹ The worst was yet to come.

The United States Navy had found prior to 1941 that anti-submarine reconnaissance aircraft equipped with radar were perhaps the most effective deterrent to submarine attack. Even with this knowledge, when war was declared in 1941, America had built virtually none of these aircraft. Subsequently, during the year ending June 1941, submarines sank nearly three million tons of British, Allied and neutral shipping.¹²

After Germany declared war on the United States on December 10, 1941, U-boat strategic commander, Admiral Doenitz, moved U-boat operations to American territorial waters. Sinkings increased to a peak of 500 thousand tons a month (90 percent of which were off the United States coast) even though Germany only operated five U-boats at any one time in the Western Atlantic. Thus with two to three years of advanced warning, America was unprepared:

"During all this time the Americans were striving to put their defense in order, but at the start they were so grievously lacking in resources and in experience that much time was needed. Even so small a contribution to their strength as the loan of ten

¹¹Donald G.F.W. Macintyre, The Battle of the Atlantic, (New York: Macmilian, 1961), 25.

¹²Ibid., p. 27.

corvettes and twenty-four trawlers from the British navy was very welcome; as for experience, Doenitz could report to Hitler in May that the American patrol vessels and aircraft were not yet a serious threat to the submarines. At that time only one submarine had been sunk off the American coast since the campaign had started."¹³

Notwithstanding the above, there was some significant support for early mobilization in key United States Government offices. President Roosevelt was himself rooted in internationalism and engagement as a loyal Wilsonian and original backer of the League of Nations. Though FDR espoused a public "middle-of-the-road" line for political expediency, he was consistently influenced by his policy advisor Norman H. Davis, himself a fervent believer in United States international involvement and collective security.¹⁴ The State Department was also slanted toward internationalism. However, the strong internationalist leanings within the executive branch was more than offset by the strength of isolationist sentiment in Congress.

¹³Ibid., p. 143. Doenitz in his memoirs added, "The two navies had, of course, been working in close cooperation, and there had been a constant interchange of information between them. In these circumstances the existence of some system of anti-submarine defense in American coastal waters was only to be expected; and all in all we believed that we should find conditions as those which had obtained a year or two earlier in British waters. Sooner or later, of course, these favorable conditions would gradually disappear ...It was, therefore, of primary importance 'to take full advantage of the favorable situation as quickly as possible and will all available forces, before the anticipated changes occurred.'" (Karl Doenitz, Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days, (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1959), 255)

¹⁴Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, 3.

America had warning and warning time. World events and the continual dispatches from American foreign service officers in Berlin throughout the 1930's repeatedly warned that Hitler was bent on eventual world domination, "but their prophecies remained buried in State Department files."¹⁵ In 1941, the vote by Congress to renew 1940's one-year draft authority was, after serious political arm-twisting, a tie. The bill finally passed 203-202 and meant that the United States would have a draft in 1941 and a conscript army in place when the Japanese struck.¹⁶

No study of pre-World War II mobilization would be complete without a review of General George C. Marshall's singularly individual efforts to improve military readiness and strength. His efforts stood as notable exceptions during a period when the threat was real, yet perceived as too distant. Marshall's strategic vision for force reconstitution began in earnest in 1939 and never subsided. In 1940, he stated to Congress:

"As to the existing crisis abroad, we must face the facts. Any major developments there should be paralleled by added precautions in this country. If the situation grows more desperate, we should add to the numbers of seasoned troops...If Europe blazes in late spring or summer, we must put our house in order before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere."¹⁷

¹⁵Ibid, p. 13.

¹⁶Michael Barone, Our Country, (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 149.

¹⁷John T. Nelsen II, General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army, 1939-

Marshall went on to say that he "opposed massive, sudden expansions."¹⁸ He also opposed waiting until the last moment and then attempting the impossible. Marshall's reasonable and steady approach to mobilization and reconstitution appeared as a coherent, unwavering plan at a time of alarming uncertainty. The consistency with which he repeatedly articulated a calm, deliberate, measured, well-thought-out approach was crucially important to winning over those who thought the threat too distant. Other efforts by military leaders to dramatize the circumstances (no matter how salient) were viewed as biased and philosophically based – not threat based.

Marshall succeeded in building up the army and the navy. His heroic effort was absolutely essential in the midst of a congressional inertia that would not have severely constrained American readiness. Without Marshall's perspicacity, America, despite its abundant resources and industrial capacity, would have been unable to save Europe from Nazi conquest.

Korea. American preparedness and mobilization for the Korean war parallels that of Second World War. In June 1950, active Army strength stood at 593 thousand which comprised ten active divisions (of which, four divisions representing 110 thousand troops of occupation forces were stationed in Japan). All divisions were individually far understrength and averaged

41, (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, February 1993), 24.

¹⁸Ibid.

only 60 percent of their authorized manning levels. After a policy speech by Secretary of State, Dean Acheson in January 1950, an ambiguous national security strategy clouded the issue of South Korea's inclusion under the United States defense umbrella. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean armies crossed the 38th parallel. While the offensive by the North Koreans was not specifically forecasted, to some it came as no surprise as the result of escalating tension (since 1945) and unclear foreign policy. North Korean military build-up was detected by General MacArthur's intelligence organization in the Spring of 1950. The concentration of forces along the 38th parallel and the evacuation of civilians from the border areas were reported to the United States Far East Command headquarters and to Washington. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, the warnings went completely unheeded.¹⁹

After the United States decided to defend South Korea, mobilization was painful. Planners had to fill-out United States Far East army divisions by stripping the CONUS general reserve of infantry battalions, other units, and individual replacements. In two months, the strength of the general reserve had fallen to 90 thousand, losing most of its capacity to respond to a major contingency. Additional reserve component troops and units were called to duty. They were used both to replace the depleted

¹⁹This is not to infer that one must respond to every pessimistic military estimate, but more to illustrate the difficulty with knowing true intentions.

general reserve and to provide a reservoir of units and individuals to reinforce the Far East Command and strengthen European defenses. A total of eight Army National Guard divisions were federalized during the course of the conflict.

The four occupation divisions under General MacArthur were severely undermanned. Early United States response to regenerate them in Korea was perilously weak. *Task Force Smith*, the initial, lightly equipped contingent of the 24th Division, suffered heavy casualties against enemy armor in a costly delaying action in South Korea. Only three of the four Japan-based divisions could eventual deploy to Korea in July. The time needed to fill out and train the half-strength National Guard divisions delayed deployment of the first two Guard divisions to March 1951. One year after the outbreak of hostilities, the Eighth Army reached the level of eight divisions, which it maintained for the duration of the conflict.²⁰ Even this force did not prove capable of fully achieving even limited political objectives. Three years of combat led to a war termination stalemate that exists today.

In summary, with respect to this selected, but typical historical analysis, the United States has: (1) had strategic warning and yet has not traditionally acted to mobilize or reconstitute forces (particularly those that do not require obvious sustainment during peacetime such as battleships and aircraft carriers); (2) resisted a large standing military for

²⁰Field Manual 100-5 Operations, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 3-8.

both philosophical and fiscal reasons, and yet has also not been able to effectively (quickly to avoid otherwise unnecessary casualties) mobilize or reconstitute manpower despite the presence of abundant raw resources; and (3) has been able to use a robust and flexible industrial manufacturing capacity to out-produce the opposition and quickly turn the course of war.

From this follows a question for analysis: are the results in each of these areas useful for predicting United States capabilities, or lack thereof, for the future? However, before assessing these elements in today's political-military arena, a historical analysis of the national military fiscal spending will further amplify trends from policy making.

Fiscal Response and Responsibility.

Not surprisingly, United States military spending patterns have been tied directly to war or major conflicts. In total, the United States has experienced increases and decreases in defense spending four times in the past five decades. In each case, the declines only stopped in response to a foreign policy crisis, or on the eve of war, giving way to often dramatic build-ups (see table 1). The peaks and valleys in defense spending over the last 50 years are tied to the Second World War, the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, and the end of the Cold War. The most recent reduction following the build-up for the Cold War is entering its tenth year.

Table 1. Military Growth Prior to World War II²¹

Year	Military Personnel (mil)	Military Spending (\$-bil)
1933	.2	.8
1940	.4	1.8
1941	1.8	6.3
1942	3.9	23
1943	9.0	63
1944	11.5	76
1945	12.1	81

Post World War II to Present. Shortly after the Second World War, the United States foreign policy emphasis shifted to oppose Soviet expansionism and strategic forces. Preparedness was perceived as the ability to mobilize quickly in the event of war rather than to maintain forces to prevent war. Economic emphasis was to suppress inflation and a balance the budget. Fiscal priorities were reassessed after the fall of China to communism. The consideration of a marked defense build-up in NSC-68²² (though never formally approved by the president) was, in essence, enacted by the United States' decision to fight the Korean War. Though a military build-up was underway, the cost of unpreparedness was still felt in Korea in a series of early tactical defeats and over six thousand casualties.

The post-Korea demobilization was not as radical as that following the Second World War. Instead, United States conventional presence overseas was prioritized and maintained.

²¹Barone, Our Country, 153-154.

²²NSC-68 was a National Security Council resolution directed at opposing communist expansion.

The nation continued to focus on the Soviet threat and built a Cold War defense establishment commensurate with the policy of containment. An emphasis was placed on preparedness and forces-in-being. Deficit financing became acceptable as domestic national product and the standard of living continued to outpace any negatives that an increasing debt might have caused.

The defense budget stagnated after Vietnam, as did the economy. By 1979, United States active duty manpower was 25 percent lower than pre-1936 levels, and this in a new world where the United States had far greater foreign commitments. A growing threat in the Middle-East and assessment of the failure of Vietnam sparked the end of the declining trend of defense spending and the beginning of a sustained build-up in the early 1980s.

This build-up was unique. Policy makers viewed the expanding Cold War as a very real threat. Capacity to strike at the heart of the Soviet strength -- its military might -- resulted in defense budget spending to support a strong, if not superior, United States military force. Fiscal pressure from an expanding debt and the evidence that the United States military had achieved unparalleled superiority over its Soviet counterpart triggered a decline in defense spending in 1985 that continues today.

As congress is ultimately responsible for raising and supporting a standing military capability, an analysis of the historical record must concentrate on the congressional decision making process. Yet, to end analysis there is to ignore the influence of the DoD's major role in the process. From a purely

fiscal perspective, there never seems to be good time to stop the decrease in defense spending during peacetime. Therefore, in absence of national security or foreign policy crisis, DoD and Congress will have to depend on their own initiative to prevent a steady erosion of defense capabilities to a point which yields unacceptable risks.²³

History shows that Congress does act, but acts short-sightedly. Congressional action and decision has historically left the United States perilously at risk to fight the first battle in whatever the next war was. Additionally, without a clear and present danger, low levels of military preparedness have been sustained without careful analysis of the conditions necessary to foster reconstitution. Modernization, readiness, and the capacity to reconstitute have not been carefully maintained. The case study in this report will examine the present and forecasted conditions that may extend this unflattering legacy for an essential military capability.

²³Michael B. Donley, "Building a New Defense Consensus," Joint Forces Quarterly, (Autumn/Winter 1994-95), 20-22.

CHAPTER III

A DECONSTRUCTION OF RECONSTITUTION

In 1991, President Bush defined the United States security strategy in the changing face of an uncertain global calculus. From an operational perspective, the United States force structure was to change from one that was forward deployed to one of reduced forward presence which would be reinforced by contingency forces during crisis response. This would be further buttressed by sustainment of high force level readiness should mobilization be required. However, it was decided that the United States would need to retain a "hedge" against the emergence of a new global threat. That "hedge" was provided by the fourth pillar of this new security strategy - reconstitution.²⁴

If the uncertainty of the post-Cold War era makes it impractical to predict what America's year 2010 national security posture will be, the near-term task should be to preserve future military options by making decisions to acquire or retain effective capabilities to execute the missions of tomorrow, whether they exist today or not. To this end, the security strategy of reconstitution has a nice overall synergy.

²⁴George H. Bush, National Security of the United States, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 29-30.

By way of contrast to the synergy of reconstitution, it is generally understood that the United States would never purposely or willingly enter into a known war of protracted attrition -- a type of war that requires a sustained commitment over time in the face of changing and increasing social, political and economic pressures [even with a relative position of strength in each area].²⁵ Yet, the President decided in 1991 to embrace the strategy of reconstitution that responded to a near-term reduced threat to United States interests. However, like a protracted war of attrition, reconstitution requires a sustained commitment over time to maintain the ability to generate and sustain wholly new forces in the face of changing and increasing social, political and economic pressures.

This is not to say that the strategy of reconstitution is wrong, but it is a challenging commitment. The very premise of sustaining a reconstitution strategy plays into basic and known American vulnerabilities as compared to, and illustrated by, the problems of prolonged attrition warfare. Force structure planners and fiscal decision makers at all levels need to understand the difficulty of this strategy at both the micro and macro levels.

²⁵For example, United States Army doctrine specifically argues against attrition warfare as a result of experiences in the Vietnam war.

A Strategy/Policy Assessment


In general, difficulty in assessing a policy increases as the factors that go into the formulation of the policy become less tangible. This is particularly true in the case of reconstitution for the following reasons: security environment assessments vary widely, timelines potentially stretch over decades; governmental decision making criteria change with new congressional and executive branch membership; and unpredictable advances in technology call for reappraisals of capabilities. Nevertheless, a 'road-map' to assess the policy of reconstitution can be outlined.

First, decision objectives and systems objectives of a policy can be analyzed to determine if the final outcome of the policy will satisfactorily achieve those objectives. The policy should be valid [or have a close correlation of cause to effect] and acceptable [or practical given certain realities]. Subsumed throughout the assessment is that resources are limited and scarce. In summary, this analysis will most likely hinge on the policy's (or in this case - strategy's) ability to balance the validity and of the decisions it produces against the test of practicality.

Reconstitution can be viewed within the framework of *ends, ways, and means*. The 'ends' of reconstitution are defined by national security objectives: *an effective deterrence by retaining the ability to mobilize and regenerate a global warfighting*

capability. The 'means' of reconstitution are: the industrial base, the [trained] military manpower pool, cadre units, equipment stockpiles and war reserves, research and technology, and trained military leadership. The link between these reconstitution's 'ends' and 'means' are the 'ways': intelligence systems, decision making processes, the graduated military response (GMR) system, the doctrine and policies of the military departments. The problem of reconstitution can be viewed as the problems of preserving these 'ways', and ensuring these 'means' remain effective (see figure 1).

Figure 1. Strategic Ends Versus Means²⁶



²⁶Henry C. Bartlett and Timothy E. Somes, "Introductory Essay—Long Range Planning in a Changing World," Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol. III: Strategy and Resources, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1992), 8.

Reconstitution Assessed

Decision and System Objectives. The decision objective for reconstitution is to allow the United States to cut force levels (ideally sized to the current threat assessment), save national resources, and yet maintain the ability to regenerate and sustain forces as required. Given the expanding deficits and the potential economic vulnerabilities caused by the growing national debt, the presidential decision to embrace a reconstitution strategy seems valid.

The system objectives for reconstitution are to achieve credible deterrence and, when necessary, reconstitute forces. These represent the purposes for the strategy of reconstitution. However, the previous historical analysis does not support the ability of the system to achieve its objectives. Furthermore, the United States has not shown the will to sustain the 'means' and the 'ways' over time — and very little evidence exists that the future will be different.

In fact, the current draft of the new National Military Strategy has completely dropped reconstitution as a stated pillar.²⁷ Staff members state that given a current assessment of the warning time the United States will have preceding global war [in some DoD circles estimated to be about five to seven years],

²⁷Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

it is assumed that the United States could and would reconstitute most forces to meet any major emerging threats.²⁸ This assumption implies that a reconstitution capability will exist without the necessity of strategic top-down-leadership emphasis. To assume this is to accept the validity of historical data only as it points to previous final outcomes, and not to accept the specific difficulties in reconstitution that were overcome to achieve those final outcomes.

Secondly, this assumption subtly shifts the burden of short term force structure decisions away from the strategy itself and toward the risk as depicted in the ends versus means model (figure 1). For long range decision makers, shifting the burden to risk is easily done as risk is ill-defined and a cost is not associated with it (until after the damage of the next war has been assessed). However, by adding a *risk premium*²⁹ to decisions made to reduce force structure, planners could better expose the true costs associated with decisions that leverage future capability on risk.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹The risk-premium is that extra return which risky projects have to earn over 'safe' projects to be acceptable [or to achieve a neutral preference]. Some policies or strategies in which the government chooses to invest serve to reduce the risks individuals face. For these policies, the risk premium is negative: that is, individuals [or the representative governments] are willing to pay something to reduce the risk. While it is considered impractical as well as economically unsound to apply a *specific risk premium* at the federal government level in actual contractual negotiation, there is still a value using a true cost figure in decision making to more correctly state the price of risk adversity.

As the cost of risk is better defined, the focus for analysis shifts back to the 'means' and 'ways' of reconstitution. Can the current set of 'means' and 'ways' be expected to foundationally support and stimulate the successful implementation of a strategy that is no longer driven by stated strategic emphasis, but is instead implied?

Elements of Reconstitution.

The 'means' and the 'ways' of reconstitution compose the system and can be summarized into these areas for analysis:

- the defense industrial base and technology
- warning time, intelligence and response mechanisms
- force structure decision making processes³⁰

The Defense Industrial Base and Technology. The United States presently has a significant industrial base production potential for force reconstitution. However, there are serious concerns about the continued vitality and responsiveness of America's resource base, and the ability to compete with foreign countries as our military investment declines. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated, "If we can preserve a healthy national manufacturing base we will have accomplished this

³⁰For the purposes of analysis, these process include: philosophical tenets, background and foundations rooted in the Base Force concept, and the force planning mechanisms of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Services Planning System (JSPS).

[reconstitution] objective. Any new major threat, or a reconstituted Soviet threat, will take years to develop."³¹

History has few lessons applicable to managing the defense industrial base management in the 1990's. There have been major shifts in economic policy over the past 40 years. The view that the government ought to overrule the verdicts of markets and intervene to assist either struggling industries or promising new ones was once economically ridiculed. This is now not so grandly dismissed and, in fact, governmental protection of vital defense related industries has been embraced by successive executive administrations. Questions today are not whether to intervene, but when, where, how, and if-and-when to stop. This is all in response to evolving relationships that are centralized on international economic interdependencies and dependencies of trade, labor, and capital transfer.

Additionally, increasing evidence of protectionism policies (as other nations enact barriers to protect their emerging industry until they could compete on favorable, not just equal terms with the U.S) turned free market thinkers into those that now espouse 'managed trade.' This, in turn, has become a serious linchpin to national economic security and throws a much brighter light on sourcing statistics for defense industry as well. As technology pushes innovation, the most basic resources, such as

³¹Les Aspin, "The First Post-Cold War Defense Program," Defense '93, Issue 2, p. 6.

those of the semiconductor industry, have become critical source elements and highly vulnerable national security concerns.

Strategic trade theory has now countered classic comparative advantage theory. Thus, the policy difficulties are now far more vast and can be rife with regulatory contradictions. For example, machine tool, telecommunications and supercomputer companies receive government subsidy to develop military technology but are, by other government regulations, prevented from selling them in global commercial markets.³² Furthermore, as defense cuts effect these subsidies and force leaner accounts, companies desire a more laissez-faire policy to redirect internal assets and research.

The government is involved in far more areas than 40 years ago which exacerbates these relationships. A myriad of competing policy agendas take on equal standing with defense as the

³²Foreign sourcing has become a difficult issue. To remain competitive, U.S. manufacturers must look for the highest quality sub-system sourcing at the lowest cost, which often means buying components overseas. Foreign nations often exercise considerable control over their economies and producers, and may take actions inconsistent with U.S. national security interests. It has been estimated that if foreign sources were completely unavailable in a crisis, accelerated U.S. production of key weapon systems (such as the AIM-7 missile and anti-submarine sonobuoys) could continue for only two months. It would then take six to 14 months before U.S. sources could supply industries with critical components and materials for continued production. Even when capabilities for production are contained within the U.S., estimates are it would take two to four years to restore production capability to 1990 levels for items whose lines have gone "cold." Outdated facilities, fewer prime contractors and subsystem suppliers, re-education of a production work force and manufacturing lead times combine to reduce the capability of industry to convert rapidly to military production and expand to emergency operating capacity. (Report of the Defense Conversion Commission, "Ensuring Defense Industrial Base Capacities, Capabilities," Defense '93, p.24).

political power of the Cold War wanes without a recognizable major military threat on the visible horizon. Special interests groups call for a more diverse technology policy that de-emphasizes defense and focuses on the environment, public health, and community stability.³³ The defense industry receives up to 80 percent of their own research and development accounts from government funds and, as a result, find that their entire internal management structures are very vulnerable to small variances in government assistance.

The key question for national defense policy-makers today is how to maintain and upgrade defense production capabilities and concurrently maintain a commercial production competitiveness as the sole customer for defense (the United States government) stops buying.³⁴ The framework for defense investment depends on the prevailing national vision for the defense establishment and its relationship to the civilian economy. If reconstitution is a prominent strategy, and the civilian economy is today more closely tied to the defense economy as ever before, it follows that the government would embrace a vigorous macroeconomic investment strategy. However, the range of investment strategies, and the

³³Anne Markusen and Joel Yudken, "Economic Strategies for a Changing World," Technology Review, April 92, 23-28;30.

³⁴DoD's four principle objectives for the industrial base are:(1) it must support the base force in peacetime; (2) it must support planned contingency-based needs; (3) it must be able to build up production capacity faster than the threat; (4) it must be as efficient and cost effective as possible. (Department of Defense White Paper, dated 20 May 1992, 1)

political wrangling over priorities have limited what needs to be a coherent, strong effort.

Earlier defense mobilizations in this country occurred in a substantially different context than today. Conditions following the First and Second World Wars were more amenable to older planning models for several reasons, some already highlighted.³⁵ Chief among them is the mobilization limitations inherent to current industrial capacity. Should current defense investment be further dispersed, it is estimated that neither facilities nor the skilled labor can be readily reassembled. Appendix (1) presents a discussion of the multiplier effect of investment on the defense industry and concludes that the dynamics of defense production are largely magnified because of systems lags and feedbacks, and depend heavily on the foresight of future defense needs built into production policies.

³⁵Joel B. Dubow, "Defense Planning: Managing Market Contraction," Defense Analysis, vol. 9, 1993, p. 327-391. Other reasons from this citation include:

(1) Excess Market Demand existed. Following these conflicts, most Americans had excess savings and jobs to which they could return. Hence, there was a pronounced market demand for consumer products which could be met primarily by only domestic producers.

(2) Financial Liquidity. The government and private sectors were in a much more favorable position to invest in mitigation of layoffs than today because of restrictions imposed by common debt financing.

(3) International Competition. The economy is much more globally linked today. Companies divesting from a defense business may reinvest outside the U.S. as readily as inside.

(4) Acceleration of Product Life Cycles. While much slower in general than civilian product cycles, defense product cycles are faster than ever before in areas that offer a decisive edge in combat due to technological advancement.

The United States cannot afford either the time or the money to recreate the facilities and expertise currently existing in a industrial base whose overall liquidity and economic position is relatively much weaker than earlier decades. It is estimated that the money and time to reconstitute a shipyard today would be \$1.5 billion and 6-7 years; roughly five times that of 40 years ago in both categories.³⁶ Table (2) is an example of current lead times for aircraft components. The table illustrates a best case time requirement that would become several times worse without sustained production investment. Furthermore, the wealth of corporate knowledge will become practically unavailable, even if the money to reconstitute were to be available.

Table 2. Waiting Time For Aircraft Components³⁷

<i>Waiting Time for Aircraft Components</i>			
Aircraft Components	Average Lead Time (months)	Aircraft Components	Average lead Time (months)
Auxiliary power units	27	Wings	27
Radars	27	Actuators	21
Avionics	24	Empennage	29
Landing Gear	28	Castings	10
Wheels & brakes	21	Forgings	15
Nacelles	21	Ejection Seats	18

In summary, options for managing the defense industrial base are complicated, incredibly difficult, and vastly different than

³⁶1991 Joint Military Assessment, "The Comeback Capability," Defense '91, May/June 1991, 24-29.

³⁷Ibid., p. 27.

before. Typically, it is easier to focus on the bigger, more foundational programs, yet programmatic policy decisions await that will have a profound influence on industry as industry responds to the incentives and disincentives inherent to national security policy.³⁸ These complexities have led to an easier and prevalent focus aimed at maintaining a base force specifically tailored to counter a Soviet-like global threat. But this narrow focus potentially misses the insidious but pronounced effects felt by the hundreds of smaller, critical subsystems producers that contribute substantially to our security but can not remain solvent without stable and visionary policy. History not only does not provide the answers, but even misleads planners as they consider historical outcomes over failures in past reconstitution processes.

Warning Time, Intelligence and Response. The following are intelligence assessments by former Central Intelligence Agency Director R. James Woolsey, Jr. to the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 10, 1995:

"Iraq has been subdued. ...North Korea is in a positive mood swing. ...Russia is befuddled by internal troubles. ...Iran is a few years away from developing nuclear weapons. ...Iran is making money from oil to finance ambitions as they funnel more than \$100 million per year to terrorist organizations. ...Iran is shopping for tanks and submarines

³⁸Heavy combat vehicles, shipbuilding, F-15 and AH-64 aircraft, the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison, Trident and Seawolf nuclear submarines and several types of precision guided munitions will be terminated or kept at minimum production rates with decisions in the near future.

from Russia and missiles from North Korea, and concurrently working hard to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. ...There are no changes to North Korea's military posture despite recent assurances that they are conceding on nuclear weapons production."³⁹

The obvious problem from assessments like these is that they nearly always consist of mixed signals and tend to cover the entire spectrum of interpretation. This highlights the tenuous relationships between intelligence, intentions, and warning time. Each are integral to the strategy of reconstitution and either enhance or inhibit strategic credibility. Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney defined how the concept of an increased warning time could enhance the strategy of reconstitution:

"The changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union dramatically increase the time available to meet any renewed threat of a massive, theater-wide attack on Europe. Such long warning of a renewed global threat enables us to reduce our forces-in-being to levels sufficient to meet regional threats that are now our focus. This allows us to reduce our forces now, so long as we are prepared to build, as the president has said, "wholly new forces" should the need to counter a global threat re-emerge."⁴⁰

The strategy of reconstitution serves as a kind of cheap insurance policy against the worst kind of national emergencies. It is premised on the assumption that the United States will have

³⁹William Matthews, "Old Foes Not So Menacing," Air Force Times, 23 January 95, 21.

⁴⁰Dick Cheney, "The Military Strategy," Defense '91, March/April 1991, 11.

ample warning time in which to mobilize American industry, and that the infrastructure for such an exercise will exist. It is also linked to acquisition policy as the maintenance of the industrial base must also permit reconstitution of larger, highly capable forces should a new kind of threat develop. However, even if all these conditions exist, and are maintained, a critical link to the process is the fortitude and will of the nation to decide to reconstitute within the given warning time.

With sophisticated satellite, air, sea, and ground-based intelligence systems, it is predicted that the United States will have ample warning time to detect any strategic military buildup by a hostile nation which may jeopardize vital United States interests. Most government sources have indicated two years is the minimum available warning time; however, some predict as long as five-to-eight years advance notice may be possible.⁴¹ Presumably, longer lead times to react to emerging military threats negate the importance of early and rapid force reconstitution. Hence, it appears that we can almost eliminate any force that requires a near-term reconstitution capability if lead times remain extended.

This part of the strategy rests on two conditions: one, that we actually do possess the intelligence capabilities to assess correctly the threat; and two, that we will act in a positive

⁴¹Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Joint Staff, Washington D.C.

manner in time to deter or be prepared for that threat. It has been argued by others and shown earlier in analysis that the first condition is as much an art as a science, and rests largely on the persuasiveness of the messenger, and the second condition is historically unfounded. It could be argued that since reconstitution is a strategic pillar, we are more cognizantly aware and triggered to respond than ever before. Yet the recent decision to remove reconstitution from the national military security draft seems to hurt support for that view.

Also, there are competing and conflicting data as to what lead times are required to reconstitute certain specific forces. While many studies have been completed to determine how long it would take to reconstitute a shipyard, none have been done to assess the time required to reconstitute a formidable anti-submarine warfare force.

For example, if it is observed that another nation embarks upon a program to obtain an aggressive offensive submarine capability that could be a substantial threat to the United States and would actually outstrip our defensive capabilities in eight years, the warning time by general definition would be eight years. However, it may be shown that due to the reasons outlined in the industrial base analysis, the lag to recreate a counter-force (aircraft, submarines and helicopters) could take seven years once the orders for production are given. The true warning time is then a matter of months.

In summary, the first key element of optimizing one's warning time is to correctly identify potential and emerging threats. Historically, a threat is both an existing capability and the probability of intent. The United States has not in the past acted to reconstitute force simply to match capabilities, with the possible exception of the Carter-Reagan defense build-up (though there were many other underlying factors as well). Furthermore, the U.S has been slow to act in advance of a hostile act even if the capability has been linked to probable intent. If reconstitution is to be credible and viable (and not inordinately increase risk), then the stimulus to respond to emerging threats must be pervasive.

Another area where decision makers can fail to optimize warning time is to not to decide to act on the threat assessment in the corresponding time available to create the weapon system [train the operators/provide the leadership/build the platform and/or hardware]. If they fail in either area, it will lead to an inevitable repeat such as demonstrated in the previous historical analysis and leave the United States woefully unprepared. Once again, the measure of America's ability to win the war will be directly related to its ability to lose the first battles and recover. The incentives to make decisions in advance of conflict are as much resident in the system as they are the individual. This leads the analysis to assess force structure processes and

their underlying philosophical tenets that enhance or undermine these types of decisions.

Force Structure Decision Making Processes. For the purposes of analysis, these processes include: philosophical tenets, background and foundations rooted in the Base Force concept, the Gradual Military Response system, and the following force planning mechanisms: the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Services Planning System (JSPS). Chapter IV details the PPBS and JSPS systems as they apply to reconstitution and supports general conclusions that will follow in analysis. However, these processes themselves are products of underlying philosophical tenets (some of which are in obvious tension with one another) that should be addressed in order to understand why, or why not, a strategy of reconstitution can work effectively within them. These tenets are inherently subsumed in three ways: the context of constitutional responsibility, the military's basic principles of war, and the way in which one views the role of government.

The Philosophy of Reconstitution.

The founders and framers of the constitution first dealt philosophically with the question, "how much force is enough?" The original wording proposed for the constitution granted

authority to congress "to build and equip fleets."⁴² During debate, a modified clause was proposed which represented one side of the argument added "that in time of peace the army shall not consist of more than [to be agreed amount] men." One representative addressing the focal point of the debate asked "as to whether no troops were ever to be raised until an attack should be made on us?" As a result, a significant change was made to the original wording which changed the entire perspective of congressional authority, and is best reflected by the finally accepted clause "to provide and maintain a navy."⁴³ In response, another representative present in Philadelphia concluded, *"Preparations for war should generally be made in time of peace, and a standing force of some sort may, for ought we know, become unavoidable."*⁴⁴

Thus was introduced the first substantive result of debate on whether this country's congress should be responsible for processes that will find the United States prepared for war, or simply responsible to respond to war. Surprisingly, the debate persists, and perhaps at no other time in this country's history is it as intense due to the combined lack of a discernible enemy and the pressure of mounting deficits.

⁴²Catherine Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia, (Boston: Little Brown, 1996), 234.

⁴³The Constitution of the United States, Section II, Article 8. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁴Bowen, Miracle in Philadelphia, 260.

Another philosophical influence on reconstitution is closely related to the one of the current principles of war: *gain and retain the initiative*.⁴⁵ To adopt a preeminent strategy of reconstitution is to concede the initiative much in the same way as a over-emphasis on contingency planning hurts initiative – for example: *if the enemy does A, then we will do B; if they do C, then we will do D*. Hence, the decision maker is always in a reactionary mode with little or no margin for error.

The contextual parallel for reconstitution follows: that we *assume if they do A, we will decide in time to do B and have the means to do B*. This whole strategy doesn't sit well with those who rightly point out that the initiative now lies with the potential enemy as we rely on difficult-to-sustain foundations of future capabilities.

Lastly, for other philosophical reasons, the conceptual problems of reconstitution seems to fall on deaf ears of many of the even the most conscientious defense planners. This is because many hold a philosophical *unconstrained vision* of defense planning. This view directly effects the way one would approach the strategy of reconstitution and whether planners would or should establish systematic incentives to support it.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Field Manual 100-5, p. 2-4.

⁴⁶Thomas Sowell, "Constrained and Unconstrained Visions," Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol. III: Strategy and Resources, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1992), 113-126.

There are two opposing ways one may philosophically approach the political economy and the role of government: one is with a *constrained vision*, and the other is with an *unconstrained vision*. The basic difference between the two is the differing notional ideas on the basic nature of man. The *constrained vision* views man as inherently selfish. This view would have a decision maker construct a system which promotes tradeoffs. The *unconstrained vision* views man as capable and self-motivated to put the benefits of society over self. The person who has an *unconstrained vision* would create, promote and focus on solutions,⁴⁷ not systematic processes which act as limits for man's failings.

If one plans for and embraces a *constrained vision*, then it follows that economic benefits to society are largely unintended by individuals, but emerge systematically from the interactions of the marketplace — under the pressures of competition and structured incentives that lead to individual gain. Moral sentiments are only for shaping the general framework of the laws (for defense acquisition — regulations) within which this systematic process could go on. This leads decision makers to view the decision process as a series of tradeoffs and not of seeking final solutions.

Without fully grasping the difficulties, both philosophical and structural, the strategy of reconstitution falls into the

⁴⁷Particularly as these solutions are made by men and women who first have the interests of society in mind.

solution paradigm. It says that 'man' will make the right decision at the right time for the benefit of society (for example, the right reason regardless of the short term pain that can reach personal levels). For reconstitution, one who subscribes to the constrained view works to constantly review and apply systematic pressures to assist the near-sighted and selfish decision maker instead of resting on the solution of reconstitution itself to put off difficult choices.

As more people in Washington follow the *unconstrained vision*, the strategy of reconstitution leaves a host of problems unresolved and getting worse, with dire projections of America again in the crisis mode as found in historical precedence. This seems to be the case as evidenced by the fact that the pillar of reconstitution is being phased out of key planning documents like the National Military Strategy, the Defense Planning Guidance, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the Program Decision Memoranda.⁴⁸

The Base Force and Global War Foundations. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin defined the Base Force in 1992 as the minimum required to simultaneously fight two major regional contingencies (MRC) around the globe.⁴⁹ Subsequently, nearly the entire energy of recent force structure processes have been to sustain this

⁴⁸Chapter IV outlines the importance and interrelated aspects of these documents.

⁴⁹Les Aspin, *The Bottom-Up Review*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 2.

force level. Nevertheless, follow-on appropriations have struggled to meet this level and force planners have been forced to work harder to 'stop the bleeding' and support the forces-in-being. This has had the effect of pushing the complex planning aspects of sustaining a reconstitution capability further into the background. Furthermore, as the Base Force emphasized MRCs, the strategy of reconstitution, with its stated focus on global war, lost some of the necessary importance it needed to sustain credibility.

Restricting reconstitution solely to a global threat is significant. Because it eschews consideration for other possibilities, it militates against very necessary applications that are far more likely than the major regional contingencies the United States may confront. More to the point, a more flexible reconstitution strategy could: (1) deter nations from seeking to compete with us as a military superpower; (2) preclude nations that pursue such military power from assuming threatening or provocative policies that would threaten our vital interests; (3) convince potential adversaries that conflict with the United States would be self-defeating; and (4) should the United States fail in all the above, a viable reconstitution strategy would generate and sustain a necessary military capability beyond the parameters of the existing Base Force and decisively defeat emerging threats. Decisions for charting and adopting a reconstitution strategy that would canvass the entire spectrum of

conflict (not just global war), would hold a far greater significance because of the repercussions reconstitution has on a wide range of capabilities that reach far into the next century.

Again, the initial strategy and policy documents viewed reconstitution solely within the context of a resurgent Soviet/Russian threat. Subsequent articulation, however, acknowledged this as being remote and sought to broaden strategic elements to apply to threats posed by regional hegemonic powers or coalitions. However, the proposed omission of reconstitution in the new national security strategy suggests that the focus nevertheless, remains on the global level and, coupled with its agreed remoteness, has essentially been dismissed by all but policy elements related to the largest, most costly weapon systems or narrowly defined defense industrial sectors.⁵⁰

Gradual Mobilization Response.

The efficacy of reconstitution has been lessened by a tendency to confuse it with gradual mobilization response (GMR) processes. Written United States mobilization doctrine and planning provide the capability to respond to early, ambiguous and specific warnings. Graduated mobilization response provides

⁵⁰Even these are threatened. Congress is currently threatening to reverse course on appropriations for the Seawolf submarine, considered a vital link to sustain industrial base capabilities for the next generation threat.

decision makers with courses of action to enhance deterrence, mitigate the impact of an event or crisis and reduce significantly the lead time associated with mobilization.

Graduated mobilization response planning and execution initiatives are divided into three stages: *preparation and planning, crisis management, and national emergency and war.* Preparation and planning initiatives seek to ensure that appropriate standby legislation and national security preparedness planning measures are in place and are maintained for use during a major crisis or war. The crisis-management stage produces decision packages and policy recommendations. Ideally, the GMR capability can be applied across the spectrum of conflict ranging from natural disasters to force reconstitution.

However, the mobilization response doctrine as it leads to reconstitution is solely triggered by a global war scenario. This leads to the aforementioned too little, too late aspects of warning time and industrial base production lag times. Furthermore, GMR response for events short of global war exclusively plan and utilize only forces-in-being. Systematically, there are no steps incorporated in GMR that specific trigger acquisition decisions to create forces beyond those that already exist.

Additionally, the basic inputs inherent to the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint Operation and Planning System (JOPES) are also based on forces-in-being.

Contingency planning phases and products do not address, plan for, or stimulate reconstitution processes.⁵¹ This lack of systematic interactive support highlights an overall philosophy that seems to lean toward the previously defined philosophy of unconstrained vision: the strategy is itself the solution.

One final "means" of reconstitution to assess is military manpower. In general, census statistics conclude that manpower will be a limiting factor only in the case of a major global war or prolonged regional conflict where attrition is high. However, as technology pushes required skills and extend training requirements, there will be shortages in critical skills areas in several specialties of the active component including combat arms, aircrew, medical, electronic technicians, linguists, engineers and intelligence.⁵² Current shortages in the reserve components include technical career fields requiring extended training. These shortages would seriously effect an attempt to accelerate reconstitution efforts.

In summary, mobilization planning must provide a range of options for implementation before a declaration of war or national emergency. To be credible, a reconstitution strategy must not be obscured by Base Force requirements, solely based on the

⁵¹These phases and products include JSPS Deliberate Planning, Crisis Action Planning, Flexible Deterrent Options, and the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).

⁵²These shortages in fact exist today and given continued shortages in instructor and training device assets, they are projected to only worsen if demand increases.

declaration of global war, or contingent on current force planning and mobilization processes that overwhelmingly focus on force-in-being.

Policy Assessment Summary.

At the outset, two analysis criteria were offered that would summarize the probability that the strategy of reconstitution will be effective. The first was to evaluate the strategy's ability to balance the validity and reliability of the decisions it might produce against a test of practicality. At the outset, President Bush's vision was that reconstitution would provide a hedge against an emerging global threat that might take several years to materialize. Though a valid and necessary strategy given the pressures that exist for scarce resources, the preceding analysis of reconstitution has shown that the reliability of the sequential and interdependent decisions that undergird this strategy's implementation processes are not trustworthy.

The second analytic criteria was expressed as the problem of preserving the ways of reconstitution, and ensuring the means of reconstitution remain effective. These were categorized within the defense industrial base, warning time management, and force structure decision making processes. In each of these, comprehensive difficulties were exposed which together lead to serious doubts as to whether both decision makers and the

systematic influences they work under will create and sustain the ways and means of reconstitution.


Further, the effect of looking at the strategy of reconstitution as a solution, and more specifically a solution for impending global war, is to rely much too heavily on the precepts and ignore or give much too little concern to the necessary systemic processes. The result is to perhaps imperceptibly skew the burden of force planning decision making toward increased risk and away from what could otherwise be a credible, forceful strategy.

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMICS AND DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION DYNAMICS

The strategy of reconstitution is completely dependent on the integration of economic analysis, defense resource allocation processes and the principles of gradual mobilization response. Although these areas have been addressed to evaluate the efficacy of the strategy itself, they each require more attention to understand how the strategy may be better executed. Each phase of the DoD planning cycle as illustrated in figure (2) impacts upon the whole of a reconstitution capability.

Figure 2. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)



Force Planning

In force planning, economic analysis is foundational for the acquisition process and inherent to the defense budgeting process. Economic analysis is the systematic approach to the problem of choosing how to employ scarce resources. Within the confines of economic analysis, an investigation of achieving a given objective in the most efficient and effective manner is conducted. The determination of efficiency and effectiveness is implicit in the assessment of the cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches and is accomplished by:

- Systematically identifying the benefits and other outputs and costs associated with alternative programs, missions, and functions and/or of alternative ways for accomplishing a given program.
- Determining and assessing the sensitivity of a decision to the values of the key variables and assumptions on which decisions are based; including technical, operational, schedule and other performance considerations.
- Evaluating alternative methods of financing investments; such as lease or buy.
- Using benefits and costs to compare the relative merits of alternatives as an aid in:
 - .. making trade-offs between alternatives.
 - .. recommending the most cost-effective alternative.
 - .. establishing or changing priorities.

For the military, programs for economic analysis are developed in the Requirements Generation System (RGS): the process the military uses to identify current and future mission needs to fill a capability deficiency or exploit a technological opportunity. The primary responsibility for this resides with the

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and the Joint Resources Oversight Committee (JROC) with the Joint Staff. The different fleet Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCS) provide the Mission's Need Statement for initial inputs.

Key military and civilian leadership take this information and develop overall force planning guidance which comes in the form of several documents: the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Joint Planning Document (JPD), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Of course, major elements influence the specifics of these plans, such as: prior years defense programs; security environment assessment changes; and economic climate.⁵³ At this point, the process splits into two paths that are dynamic, interact, and work from the same basic guidelines. However, each path has slightly different sets of criteria to perform economic analysis. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System's (PPBS) path focuses on service interests and results in a six year plan for resource procurement and sustainment. The Joint Strategic Planning System

⁵³The current defense draw-down has had an effect on the economic landscape. Overall budget deficits have fallen as a percent of GNP from 4 to 2 percent. This is well below the recent high of 5.2 percent in FY83. However, annual payments for net interest on the national debt due to the accumulated deficits of previous years will persist and are projected to be 14 percent of the budget for the next 5 years. Added to this are figures for annual growth in mandatory entitlement spending such that by 1999, the FY95 budget projects that entitlement spending and net interest will account for over 70 percent of annual outlays. Finally, with the post-94 electoral organizational changes in Congress, and the recent balanced budget legislation, the pressures on the defense budget will continue to mount.

(JSPS) focuses on scenario planning and works to develop forces which support operational plans (OPLANs) that meet strategic guidelines. The combination of these two "systems" produces the chosen broad-based alternatives for the services to consider for defense resource decisions.

In 1992, reconstitution was clearly embedded in the NMS, DPG, and JPD. Since these key documents provide guiding principles and strategies which govern force level decision making down to the individual service, reconstitution should be evident and detailed in final products like the individual service Program Objective Memoranda (POM). However, except for core programs (such as major submarine, capital ship and strategic aircraft production) it is not. Additionally, no coherent agency exists to execute the strategy of reconstitution intra-service or across-functionality.

The office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy has the mission to direct the force planning system to prepare for reconstitution. Yet evidence shows that, though there are multitude of staff personnel who understand some of the elements of the strategy, they are spread too thin within the systems and have too little ultimate authority. Reconstitution involves each of the services, the JCS, DoD departments, several federal agencies. Subsequently, a poor decision a single area or agency can have a crippling effect on strategic credibility and execution with force wide implication.

Force Programming

The JSPS of DoD planning serves as the basis for integrating the nation's military strategy, resource needs, and operational plans.⁵⁴ Three major documents, the JPD, the JSCP, and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), together provide the basis for the OPLANS from which United States' forces will operate. Together, these also influence the PPBS process as it concurrently works its way through its own cycle seeking cost-effective programs and making trade-offs between alternatives. Both the JSPS and PPBS work together to create Program Decision Memoranda and Program Budget Decisions that deliver the right forces within budget constraints.

However, these programming systems have been inherently skewed toward developing current and near-term forces – and not creating or sustaining mechanisms to undergird reconstitution capabilities. Two parts of the process highlight the inadequate and myopic aspects of current defense programming for reconstitution: the Joint Operational Planning System (JOPES), and the CPA assessment done by the Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7 on the Joint Staff).

⁵⁴William C. Keller, The Defense Allocation Resource Process, (Newport: United States Naval War College Press, January 1994), ii-7.

"Deliberate Planning" is method within the JOPES process to develop joint strategic planning documents.⁵⁵ Directed by the JSCP and done in peacetime, it can take 12-24 months. It is primarily based on predicted regional scenario conflicts. The 1993-95 JSCP required nine fully developed OPLANs, whereas the draft 1996 JSCP requires two OPLANs and fifty CONPLANs/Functional Plans.⁵⁶ This represents a shift in strategic thinking toward flexible options and broader contingencies.

"Deliberate Planning" plans for the employment of assets based on both scenario and mission requirements. As operational plans focus on mission requirements and a wide variety of contingencies, reconstitution should be inherent in force planning details. As "Deliberate Planning" becomes more flexible and visionary, it also supports reconstitution. While the trend from OPLANs to CONPLANs is good news for reconstitution, it nevertheless become marginalized as the process continues.

JOPES is also used to develop and analyze Courses Of Actions (COAs). COAs create and modify the detailed deployment data base for managing the deployment and redeployment of current forces. As the emphasis of JOPES here is skewed toward the employment of

⁵⁵The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993, Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Pub 1, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993),

⁵⁶An OPLAN is a fully developed plan that identifies all the forces and supplies required to complete a military employment of force for a specific scenario. Concept Plans (CONPLANS) and Functional Plans are much more abbreviated and require considerable expansion to convert into OPLANs.

existing forces only, JOPES primary influence on the resource allocation process comes after the decision to reconstitute force should have been made. The options contained within JOPES often do not call for future mission requirements most germane to the comprehensive aspects of reconstitution. In summary, the overwhelming and underlying aspect of the present planning process is to depend on, and plan for, only the employment of existing forces to meet expected needs.

Another area where reconstitution could be better served is during one of the final steps of the very dynamic and complex resource allocation cycle. Late in the resource allocation process, the JCS Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) reviews the plans for feasibility and joint doctrine. However, this feasibility and compatibility review is primarily constrained to assess existing force capability. This tends to produce a disconnect which manifests itself as a force structure which meets current threats only, and not one which contains requisites for reconstitution as intended by the original strategy and guidance.

Perhaps the most influential review for strategic synergy is performed by the CJCS during the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). The CPA assesses the appropriateness of the POMs as compared to the CINC Plans [i.e., right strategy/wrong force]. It also assesses the risks associated with the programmed force levels, and makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on alternative programs and budget proposals to achieve greater

conformance with strategic plans. This appears to be a key step to ensuring that reconstitution process remains viable and credible. However, there is evidence that many elements of the force structure are slowly losing their capability to reconstitute. The case study in Chapter IV provides an example of this. In summary, JCS oversight in the CPA review is ineffective and comes too late to correct budgetary decisions that are a result of a complex series of interlinked decisions.

Force Budgeting

The introduction to this paper addressed the chief problem of the budgeting phase as it relates to reconstitution. Budget estimates are prepared and submitted based on the approved programs as well as current economic assumptions contained either in the POMs or in the detailed budget guidance issued each year. Two elements often disrupt well conceived and integrated programmatic decisions. The first, as described in the introduction's example, is when budget guidance is changed to reflect updated economic estimates. At times, this can be quite significant. The second is in the case of the "off years" -- those years when the President submits budget guidance to which there is no corresponding PPBS phase (PPBS is biennial). Here, post-programmatic budget decisions can radically modify prior programming decisions. Reconstitution requires strategic stability. Reconstitution has suffered from both short-term

reprogramming decisions and longer-term "off-years" budget guidance revision.

In summary, there is a systems disconnect. One side of the resource allocation process (JSPS) is focused on existing forces and near-term scenarios. The other side (PPBS) is focused on service interests and budgetary constraints. In an era where downsizing places a much greater emphasis on short-run decisions, there has been a great and adverse effect on long term capabilities. More stable, realistic systemic processes are needed to focus on sustaining long term capabilities.

Gradual Mobilization Response and the Base Force.

Reconstitution refers to the formation of new units which do not exist. The United States is a nation which mobilizes for conflict and normally augments active forces without resorting to the reconstitution of new forces. To do this, the federal government has established four levels of gradual mobilization response (GMR): presidential Selective Reserve call up; partial mobilization; full mobilization; and total mobilization. The first three levels of mobilization deal strictly with individuals and units in the currently authorized military structure. Total mobilization, however, involves expansion of the armed forces by organizing and activating units beyond the existing approved force levels. This step further covers the mobilization of all

additional assets required, including civilian production facilities, to round out and sustain forces.

Regeneration of many forces is needed to meet the first step of mobilization. This is because many current United States' forces are manned and outfitted well below war-time contingency levels as authorized in the mobilization process. For example, the wartime level authorized for the active component of the Maritime Patrol Aviation force is 15 aircrews per squadron. Yet, today the MPA force fields only 11 aircrews per squadron due to budget constraints.

When conflict is imminent and congress declares total mobilization, the authorization to expand forces must come from congressional legislation to increase military end-strength. Up to legal (Title-10) limits, only appropriations authority is necessary. Beyond that, a change to Title-10 would be necessary. To initiate reconstitution on time (intended to be well ahead of actual conflict for many assets), DoD would have to be convinced that the threat warrants the budgetary reprogramming that they themselves would have to absorb to reconstitute forces. Then, DoD would have to convince congress that this threat (which could years away) would outweigh the current domestic issues that compete for scarce discretionary dollars. Therefore, even when "good" decisions could be made within the current force planning processes reconstitution often calls for powerful sacrifice and foresight.

DoD has oriented all plans for reconstitution toward building a global warfighting capability. Many in DoD believe that reconstitution will not work for something less than global war, such as a major regional conflict (MRC), due to the estimate that sufficient warning time will not exist for these smaller cases. As compelling, DoD analysts fear that congressional leadership could over-rely on reconstitution to "leverage" required forces to fight a regional conflict. Thus, more severe defense budget cuts could follow based on the rationale that if one can reconstitute forces before having to engage in a regional conflict, then one can cut those forces.

There are certain less-than-global war scenarios in which an "incremental" reconstitution effort would be both wise and advantageous. For example, incremental reconstitution could be advantageous during a long period of strategic and tactical warning followed by a protracted regional conflict. In light of this, if mobilization only employs existing reserve resources, and reconstitution is only considered for global war scenarios, it may be advantageous to bring reconstitution into the gradual mobilization response processes and include corresponding sequential steps that are dovetailed to GMR.⁵⁷

⁵⁷Gradual Mobilization Response (GMR) has evolved into a coherent, effective process. President Bush through his National Security Staff and Executive Order-12656 institutionalized a system for all federal departments and agencies to respond to national security emergencies, foreign and domestic. From 1988 to 1990, GMR developed from a concept to a true strategy managed in joint cooperation by Federal Emergency Management Association and the DoD. GMR has three stages, or levels of response, which are: *Stage-3 Peacetime planning and preparation; Stage-2 Crisis*

Military manpower availability is generally viewed as a limiting factor only in the case of a global war or prolonged regional conflict. Military personnel mobilization, regardless of the level, is limited by the number of reception and training centers. The president has the authority to activate up to 200,000 Selective Reserve personnel involuntarily for 90 days, and another 90 days, if required, without declaring a national emergency. Statistically, the number of qualified 18-24 year-old individuals available for military service will decrease through 1997, but gradually will begin increasing through 1999. While this is comforting in a general sense, the conditions of employment in military service have changed markedly over the past 50 years.

Several fields require advanced technical capabilities and highly trained skills. Reconstituting a force short after calling up Selected Reserves [applicable if reconstitution is viewed short of crisis management] would require, in some military fields, months of extensive training before newly accessed manpower could be employed. In addition, skill requirements are expanding into what used to be considered the most rudimentary areas such as

Management; Stage-1 National Security Emergency/war. GMR also addresses six functional areas which it builds during the planning of a crisis: industrial; economic; infrastructure; human resources; government; and civil preparedness. Though GMR has been mostly used in response to immediate crisis, it could be used to provide increasing levels of reversible steps to work gradually to total mobilization. This would offer political and military leaders various alternatives for gauging responses and initiating deterrence.

basic infantry. Weapon systems employment and coordinated tactics on today's four-dimensional battlefield require extra education, specialized training and extensive practice. Therefore, statistics based on men and women available from census data overstate the true "combat-ready" resources available.

In summary, the defense resource allocation process does not encourage or systematically support the strategy of reconstitution. Too many resource allocation "sub-processes" run parallel to one another while often having different emphasis. Due to system shortcomings, a credible reconstitution capability may not exist for some specific forces.

Additionally, as reconstitution is used only for response to global war, the tendency is for the process to be a surge effort. This leads to inefficiency and inadequate short term results. Others have recommended structuring selective or "incremental" reconstitution packages to GMR for situations short of imminent war. Linking reconstitution to this concept is sound if GMR is to also be used in situations short of immediate crisis. It also begins to bring reconstitution from a transparent surge policy to an executable plan. Increased levels of mobilization and reconstitution are not the same, but sequential. Each could act as a multiplier effect on the other. Lastly, budgetary decision making processes should incorporate more far-reaching strategic inputs and be linked with reconstitution requirements. With this, the strategy of reconstitution could be vastly more viable and credible.

CHAPTER 5

MARITIME PATROL: A CASE STUDY

Trends indicate that by the year 2005, there will be over 100 Russian and about 50 United States' submarines around the globe.⁵⁸ North Korea, China, and Iran are purchasing Russian export-Kilo submarines through the year 2000. As of 1991, there were over 145 diesel submarines belonging to eight non-Western nations...and both those numbers have been growing.⁵⁹

At the same time, the United States has dramatically downsized its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces. SURTASS⁶⁰ ship orders have been cut from eighteen to two and nearly all underwater surveillance sensors have been closed down. The S-3 Viking carrier-based aircraft has seen its mission shift from ASW to anti-surface warfare and airborne tanker support roles. Though advanced research and development continues, United States ASW weapons and sensor production has been scaled back to minimum levels or canceled. During the last decade, the United States has

⁵⁸Jim Bussert, "Russian Submarine Fleet Poses Ominous Concern," National Defense, November 1994, 54-55.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰These are civilian operated Surface Towed Acoustic Surveillance Ships (SURTASS) that provide long range underwater acoustic detection capabilities.

gone from having six ship-yards capable of building submarines to one. That one ship-yard, General Dynamics' Electric Boat in Connecticut, is under heavy fiscal pressure as the only new sub-building contract, the Seawolf, could be canceled by Congress.

Additionally, in the last five years the Navy's land-based air-ASW force, Maritime Patrol Aviation (MPA), has been reduced by half. In 1990, there were thirty-seven active and reserve MPA squadrons flying over 300 Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft. By 1996, there will only 20 squadrons flying 172 P-3s. Furthermore, during a April 1994 Investment Balance Review (IBR) as a part of the defense re-budgeting, DoD initiated a proposal to cut MPA forces further to a total of 12 squadrons (six active and six reserve; later revised up to eight active and six reserve). At these levels, the ability to meet mission requirements comes clearly into question.⁶¹

Additionally, the "secondary" roles for MPA have never been purely secondary, even when sub-hunting was a primary concern. Stand-off airborne surveillance and offensive and defensive mining, counter-narcotic search and seizure, and over-the-horizon

⁶¹For example, to meet a requirement to sustain two anti-submarine contacts around the clock for two separate major contingencies, six forward deployed P-3 squadrons are required flying over 45 aircraft. It takes three squadrons in the active force structure to support each forward deployed patrol squadron and maintain personnel deployment turnaround and operational tempo goals. For any sustained operations short of war, a active-reserve mix of 20-24 squadrons is the absolute minimum to meet these objectives. (Anthony Maness, "Maritime Patrol Forces in Tomorrow's Navy," Airborne Log, (Spring 1992): 14-15.)

targeting are a few missions that P-3 crews perform regularly. Furthermore, near-term roles and missions slated for an enhanced MPA force include: an anti-air warning detection and targeting mission for direct Battle Force support; theater ballistic missile early warning laser/radar capability; and advanced electromagnetic propagation and environmental enhancement signal processing hardware to eliminate submarine shallow-water environmental sanctuaries.⁶² Paradoxically, while these new roles and missions proliferate, MPA assets are being decreased.⁶³


For defense allocation decision makers, forces that have a primary ASW mission represent a prime example of a part of the

⁶²The P-3 mission profile and extra load and space carrying capacity has made it the ideal target for a vast number of proposed research and development efforts to expand its roles and missions. As total force structure is reduced, each P-3 and squadron remaining has survived primarily on its versatility and capacity for multi-mission operations. While the research and development agencies recognize this for the P-3 as they view the longer term, the budget departments have remained locked on short term requirements and steadily have recommended cuts based on lesser requirements in the primary mission area (ASW), and not the potential of expanding roles. This disconnect between R&D and force planners is evidence of yet another systematic effect detrimental to reconstitution.

⁶³A former Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Planning recommends that force planners discard their scenario-based tools that are geared to identifying specific threats and requirements. He proposes instead that planners should focus on the missions that are likely to arise in the next 20 years so that acquisition decisions can be made today to field weapon systems which can endure for the next 40 years. Termed "Mission-Pull," it is especially suited to the defense budgeting process and can force the required interaction between R&D, acquisition, and budgeting. (Clark A. Murdock, "Mission-Pull and Long-Range Planning," Joint Force Quarterly, (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 28)

force structure that can be down-sized in absence of the current threat. As such, ASW forces have been reduced to regain capitalization leverage elsewhere in the force structure. Recognizing the potential for an emerging submarine threat in the future, decision makers believe that ASW forces can be reconstituted when required. Yet, as has been explored, the process of down-sizing a capability and concurrently sustaining the ability to reconstitute is extremely complex. Without careful management, reconstitution will be potentially unviable. A closer examination of the Navy's MPA community will illuminate the complexity of a reconstitution strategy and provide a test for reconstitution's credibility.

United States Navy Maritime Patrol



"We have said for some time our ability to insure the security of the United States is dependent upon the capabilities – not the stated intent – of other countries or other people to impact United States security. The P-3 is probably the most highly leveraged platform we have. ...The Navy has made a fundamental shift from Open Ocean Warfare into Littoral Warfare but the P-3 has been in the littorals from the beginning. The surveillance capabilities they have with new technology are phenomenal. The war fighters will never, ever give up the P-3 capabilities, period. What we need to make sure of is, that the war fighters are aware of how many P-3s it takes to do the

kind of things that need to be done, worldwide."⁶⁴

⁶⁴Stephen F. Loftus, "Interview-VADM Stephen F. Loftus," interview by Bob Harper, Airborne Log, (Spring 1994): 51.

This previous quote reflects MPA's thinking on P-3 roles during an era of expanding capabilities against potential enemies. MPA continues to be called on by the CINCs to conduct a variety of missions and roles beyond what current force levels allow.⁶⁵ The key problem the Maritime Patrol community sees for itself is not a clear demand for roles and missions, but a lack of effective advocacy in a defense allocation process that concentrates foremost on traditional "core" programs such as bombers for the Air Force and carriers for the Navy.

As discussed earlier, each service fund its traditional 'core' programs first. Then, programs that are peripheral to the individual service core interests, missions, and traditions must 'compete' for remaining resources. For the Navy, MPA has not been a core program. As such, MPA lacks an effective voice in the system. Because the system does not, itself, bootstrap non-core programs to meet total force strategic goals, the MPA community finds itself annually short of funding and ripe for further force level cuts -- regardless of the potential threat. For example, the P-3 inventory is within five years of reaching its original service life and no follow-on aircraft has been authorized. Only a recently funded set of service life extension packages should

⁶⁵A recently completed report (unreleased) funded by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessment (N8/N81) concluded that a force level of 20 MPA squadrons was the minimum required to support current CINC mission requirements.

extend the life of the P-3 airframes to almost 2015. BY 2015, a new aircraft will be required.⁶⁶

As stated earlier, MPA forces were nearly cut from twelve to six squadrons in 1994. The community survived the proposed cuts in large measure for two reasons: (1) the new Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had just returned from operations in Europe where he had personally observed a P-3 crew successfully conduct interdiction operations and test-fire a Maverick air-to-surface missile — and then let it be known that he as CNO would not look favorably on additional cuts without compelling rationale;⁶⁷ and, (2) a Congressional sub-committee became concerned over the proposed cuts and tasked DoD to defend its decision criteria.⁶⁸ Both these circumstances were unusual and were the result of some careful lobbying from both inside and outside the military. Nevertheless, MPA remains a peripheral community to the main defense resource allocation process and is annually vulnerable to pressure for cuts.

⁶⁶Though 2015 may be 20 years away, a follow-on decision to fund a new line of MPA aircraft must be made within the next five to seven years due to the research, development, testing, and production timeline prior to delivery.

⁶⁷Jeremy M. Boorda, "Interview: ADM Jeremy M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations," interview by Bob Harper, Airborne Log, (Fall 94): 21.

⁶⁸Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 4301, (Report No. 103-499) of the 103d Congress, 2d Session (May 10, 1994): 32.

A review of the alternatives and possible substitutions available to MPA affirms the need for the defense allocation process to sustain a MPA reconstitution capability. Because of economic problems on a global scale, many nations are looking to form partnerships for national security. Ideally, if the United States could call on another nation to support the variety of MPA missions, the requirements for United States MPA forces would be lessened. However, the majority of the fourteen nations that fly Maritime Patrol aircraft are either faced with an aging fleet of P-3s, or fly less capable aircraft that lack either the speed, endurance, mission flexibility, or a capability to detect advanced submarines.⁶⁹

The research projects currently on-going to develop anti-submarine sensor technology that could replace MPA (space based for example) are not ready for employment in the next five to fifteen years. New technologies that are arriving in the near term require both airborne receivers and information fusion centers as well as on-scene weapons delivery platforms. The P-3 has been the platform of preference for the prototypes of these programs. Thus, in light of the future ASW threat alone, substitution of foreign/allied MPA assets and missions is not an option for United States.

⁶⁹Of the 650 P-3s have been produced for United States and foreign exports, 90 percent have been retired or are within five years of reaching their original service life. Lockheed Corporation is currently working with several European countries to possibly produce a new P-3 for deliver by the year 2000.

Elements of MPA Reconstitution


Navy Maritime Patrol is a good test case for reconstitution. The primary weapon system is an aging, yet technically advanced, aircraft. MPA manpower requirements are enormous as each crew is comprised of 12 highly trained operators. ASW skills are highly perishable and requires constant recurrent training. The average training pipelines for crew members is more than 24 months. A mix of seasoned leadership is required to maintain overall crew effectiveness. An extensive system of forward basing is required as the aircraft is land-based and can not be refueled in-flight. As the aircraft, weapon systems and avionics continue to age, an extensive logistics line is required in spare parts and consumables. Put together, these areas require a vast amount of attention to remain reconstitutable. For analysis, these elements can be grouped into three areas:

- the aircraft and industrial base
- people – numbers/management/training
- forward basing and logistics

The Aircraft and Industrial Base. In 1995, the average age of Navy P-3 aircraft is nineteen years. Due to increased tasking, the average total flight hours per P-3 is steadily increasing. Maintenance "man hours per flight hour" is increasing at a rapid rate with aircraft age. Corrosion and airframe material degradation limits the aircraft's material life to approximately 29 years. The maximum fatigue life on the airframe is estimated at 38 years, though some aircraft have shown greater fatigue

stress due to more aggressive mission profiles.⁷⁰ Two programs have been funded to improve the material life of the aircraft and to capture fully the fatigue life of the P-3 of 38 years: (1) the *Sustained Readiness Program (SRP)* extends the material life of the aircraft by replacing highly corrosive areas of the airframe; and (2) the *Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)*, recaptures the fatigue life as it reworks key structural airframe areas and provides structural reinforcements. These programs were adopted as a result of a cost-analysis study based on inventory requirements reflected in the following figure.

Figure 3. Aircraft Inventory Options⁷¹



⁷⁰George Hill, *P-3C Force Structure Brief*, Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters, P-3 Assistant Program Manager (October 10, 1994).

⁷¹Nora Slatkin, *Independent Assessment of the P-3C Sustained Readiness Program (SRP)*, Assistant Secretary Navy, Research Development and Acquisition, (7 September 1994). Breakdown of airframe requirements (PAA - planned aircraft allotment):

12 Active Squadrons (PAA = 9)	108
8 Reserve Squadrons (PAA = 8)	64
Fleet Readiness Squadron	27
Special Projects Squadron	4
Pipeline (upgrade/modifications)	25
RDT&E	8
Total Airframes	236

Figure (3) also highlights a representative number of options for the MPA community to sustain a force level squadron totaling 20 squadrons. An independent study concluded that the most cost-effective choice was to SLEP/SRP 236 aircraft to meet inventory requirements over the longest time.⁷² This option has recently been funded. Though this decision extends the life of existing P-3s, it puts-off ultimate decisions as to what to do for a follow-on aircraft before existing P-3s are finally retired.

The last P-3 made for the United States Navy was delivered in the late 80's. Currently, the P-3 production line is open as it finishes delivery of eight P-3s to the Republic of Korea. The last will be delivered in 1995 and no more P-3 contracts are current or expected. Lockheed analysts estimate that if the P-3 production line is fully closed and the tooling stored, it would take 2-3 years to re-open the line, train a workforce, contract with subcontractors, recapitalize, and deliver new production P-3s.⁷³

If the decision is made to reconstitute forces to a number greater than a FY-96 twenty squadron level, the most likely decision would be to fill the aircraft gap by regenerating P-3s from the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) at Davis Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona, while initiating new production. Colloquially known as the 'Boneyard,' AMARC currently has 131 war reserve P-3s, with the number growing as the community finishes down-sizing and more are retired without undergoing SLEP/SRP.⁷⁴ AMARC estimates that these aircraft can be

⁷²Hill, P3-C Force Structure Brief.

⁷³Glenn Lowes, Lockheed Corporation, telephone interview by the author, 13 February 1995. Note: the Navy owns most of the P-3 production tooling.

⁷⁴R.J. Butler, U.S. Navy Field Service Office, AMARC, interview by the author, 8 February 1995. Note: war reserve mode is Type-1 preservation which ensures each aircraft can be flown

flown within a period of 60-90 days. These aircraft are not preserved with mission avionics and, therefore, would be allocated among squadrons as dedicated pilot training aircraft. This decision would displace enough in-service aircraft to ensure that each squadron would have at least six or seven tactically equipped aircraft (the minimum numbers required to sustain 24-hour tactical operations). New production aircraft would eventually replace the regenerated P-3s.

Reconstitution of the P-3 aircraft has a different degree of effectiveness depending on where in the life cycle it is to be started. For example, if the decision to reconstitute four squadrons is made in the year 2000, aircraft that are available at Davis Monthan combined with the SLEP/SRP numbers would be sufficient to sustain 16 squadrons while waiting for new production aircraft. The only variable not accounted for is attrition due to combat.⁷⁵

However, two variations to a reconstitution decision complicate straight-forward (strait-line) decisions. First, if the decision to reconstitute is made after year 2010, new production aircraft would not be delivered to sustain force levels before 2015, which is the date the SLEP/SRP P-3s begin to expire in great numbers (see figure 4). Therefore, even if the reconstitution decision is made in advance of a potential conflict (utilizing the warning time available), the necessary number of tactically capable aircraft would not be available. In-service

within a period of 30-90 days. Some P-3s are classified Beyond Economical Repair (BER) and not inducted into SLEP/SRP and instead retired. However, these aircraft can be reflown with extensive rework.

⁷⁵Attrition due to combat has not historically been heavy for MPA, yet as roles and missions are expanded into littoral areas and over the coastline, the likelihood of attrition must be considered.

aircraft lives would expire before their replacements could be fielded.⁷⁶

The second troublesome scenario would be where a decision to reconstitute came as the result of a major crisis requiring a substantial "surge" number of aircraft. For example, to outfit four squadrons with at least seven tactical aircraft, twenty-eight P-3s would have to be regenerated from Davis Monthan. It could take as long as one year to finish delivery of all required aircraft. If the Lockheed line is closed, the wait for new production aircraft could be as long as 2-3 years for a production run to support requirements short-of-war, and even 1-2 years for total war mobilization.⁷⁷


People and Manpower Management. An assessment of the MPA manpower requirements is particularly relevant in assessment of reconstitution. A P-3 crew consists of twelve highly trained and specialized personnel that are integrated as a team with regard to experience level as well as individual expertise. The crew mixes levels of expertise so that individual members report to or leave the squadron without a major loss of crew proficiency. But there is no built-in redundancy on a P-3 crew. While cross-training has been encouraged in recent years, an ASW mission fully taxes each crew station. There are three distinct elements to manpower that encompass the MPA reconstitution problem: leadership, officer manning, and enlisted manning.

⁷⁶This line of reasoning assumes the Lockheed production line is closed and stored.

⁷⁷Lowes, Lockheed telephone interview.

Leadership is an area that challenges any reconstitution scenario. Overall, the decrease from 24 to 12 active MPA squadrons over the past five years mitigates the reconstitution problem to one that does not become severe until after the turn of the century. Even still, the most senior pilots and some enlisted positions are projected to be below numbers required force levels in the year 2000. Should the decision be made to reconstitute P-3 squadrons, experienced leadership will be very thin under all circumstances except that of total mobilization for global war.

Figure 4. MPA Manpower Inventory Projection for Year 2000⁷⁸



The P-3 pilot, copilot, navigator, and tactical coordinator crew positions are filled by naval officers. It takes 48 months to train a pilot and 36-48 months to train a navigator and tactical coordinator (the last two positions are filled by Naval Flight Officers (NFO)). Figure (4) shows the projected officer

⁷⁸Commander William C. Zobel, USN, Bureau of Naval Personnel (Pers 211V), personal interview conducted by author, Washington DC, (15 November, 1994).

levels against the requirements for officers for the year 2000. Years showing an overmanning are mostly related to the recent rapid force down-sizing leading to the retention of more officers than squadron positions. These relationships would stabilize as the force level and accessions stabilize. Even so, some year group shortages are projected that will require fills from adjacent year groups.⁷⁹ For reconstitution decisions made in year 2000, MPA would only have enough trained pilots and NFOs for about two new squadrons by shuffling personnel. The majority of the available pilots and NFOs would come from officers with 9-15 years of service. However, as the community stabilizes at the smaller force size, this officer pool will evaporate. Any effort to reconstitute experienced leadership later would not be possible short of total war mobilization.

Presently, the current MPA enlisted inventories are for the most part in excess of the requirement to fill 12 active squadrons because of the magnitude of the recent down-sizing.⁸⁰ For MPA enlisted manpower management, like that of officer management, the farther out the decision to reconstitute, the harder it will be.⁸¹

⁷⁹For example, pilot and NFO accessions in 1993 were well short of projected requirements and are shown as year (7) experience shortfalls as related to year 2000 (in figure 5).

⁸⁰Except for the rate of acoustic operator (AW) which is understrength to the point that several squadrons are currently manned at half their authorized levels. The acoustic operator is the primary resource for detecting submerged submarines.

⁸¹It is important to understand here that the Naval Reserve MPA force is manned by former active personnel who have separated from active duty and gone into civilian employment but continue

Enlisted schools are somewhat shorter than that for officers, and therefore, the output of each of the schools will have stabilized to reflect the correct throughput to man twelve squadrons by as early as 1997.

For example, should a decision be made to add four squadrons in the year 2000, the only method to man those squadrons would be to "share" trained personnel from active commands. Deploying squadrons would be outfitted by squadrons getting ready to deploy. In most cases for MPA, the training time-lag would be 6-9 months before new operators would arrive at squadrons. The total number of MPA training pipeline accessions would be limited by class loading. Class loading is a function of qualified instructors and weapon systems trainers. These are only programmed to support a twelve active squadron force level.⁸² Hence, delays to man fully each squadron would be amplified by limitations in school commands. Even total mobilization could not speed up the process.


selective reserve duty. Training pipelines are programmed to support the active forces only. Therefore, an increase in active squadrons would be required to sustain additional reserve squadrons.

⁸²Of note, weapon systems trainers that are deemed as excess due to force down-sizing are commonly scrapped and not saved. This is not only due to concerns over storage costs, but because these trainers, without frequent modifications, rapidly become obsolete. Therefore, a purchase of new trainers would be required to support a sustained increase in squadrons. It currently takes well over one year to contract and deliver new trainers.

In all, it is estimated that it would take 12-18 months to fully man four new squadrons with highly trained enlisted operators.⁸³

Forward Basing and Logistics. Maritime Patrol squadrons operate from forward bases throughout the world. They deploy from four Naval Air Stations within the United States and spend six months fully detached to the deployment sites. Figure (5) shows the current bases utilized by P-3 squadrons and illustrates the decrease in the number of sites over the past five years (commensurate with the overall squadron draw-down). Except where the site is a United States territory or possession, the process to re-open these bases for P-3 use would require diplomatic initiative and agreement.

Figure 6. Maritime Patrol Forward Basing (Deployment Sites)



It seems a valid assumption that, should a crisis threaten any of these host nation/states, they would aggressively allow

⁸³LCDR John Clay, Bureau of Naval Personnel Pers (221C), fax transmittal, (19 January 1995): 1.

United States forces to reuse the local base facilities and runways to enhance collective defense. However, MPA anti-submarine warfare proficiency is directly tied to expertise in local oceanographic conditions and anomalies.⁸⁴ By removing access and familiarity with these areas (as is the result with the closure of some of these bases) crews will deploy without the proficiency necessary to be effective early in the conflict. However, given the opportunity costs associated with base renting and operating expenses, this is probably a reasonable trade-off.

Furthermore, the P-3 has a very good capability to operate from remote, isolated and unsupported areas for extended periods. Because access to most areas will be probably be renewed aggressively at the outset of conflict, the problem of reduced forward basing for P-3 squadrons does not appear at this time to be a major hurdle for reconstitution. However, specific P-3 logistic support requirements pose a greater burden.

A small portion of today's active P-3 fleet is being upgraded with advanced sensor suites for anti-surface warfare (ASUW) and surveillance/targeting capabilities. These aircraft have enhanced communications as well as sensor technology. It is no surprise that these P-3s are used for their multi-mission capabilities and, therefore, are in great demand by the CINCs. There are no spare parts for the P-3s with these extensive

⁸⁴Oceanographic modeling is a very inexact science and currently requires extensive sampling to be effective. This sampling process is also done by specially equipped P-3 crews.

modifications. If one of these parts is damaged or fails, extensive time delays will be experienced before a fixed or new component can be installed. Hence, to reconstitute a P-3 squadron with modernized aircraft is more complex than it first seems. It would require the purchasing (not regenerating) of enhanced sensor and communications capabilities to equip enhanced aircraft for each squadron to continue to meet multi-mission requirements.⁸⁵

Case Summary

The United States Navy's Maritime Patrol Aviation community represents a good example of a force that is dependent on a strategy of reconstitution. Due to the recent circumstances, the MPA community has been rapidly down-sized. Presently, with an excess capacity in airframes as well as in trained personnel, the ability to reconstitute MPA over the next three to five years would not be difficult...and it would not be dependent on the defense resource allocation process to sustain a near-term reconstitution capability.

However, any significant reconstitution effort after the year 2000 will face aircraft and manpower shortages. If the reconstitution is done in response to an immediate crisis (short

⁸⁵It is a routine management decision to transfer these specially equipped aircraft from squadrons coming off deployment to squadrons going on deployment, so there is no real average number per squadron, as some have four and others have none.

of war), the community will probably not be able to meet its commitments after six months. For war mobilization, reconstitution problems would persist in manpower areas due to the funnel-like effect at the school houses which limit rapid accessions.

As important to the MPA reconstitution problem discussed in terms of the "traditional" ASW role, today's MPA (P-3) has acquired new and enhanced roles and missions (i.e., ASUW, surveillance, communications). This complicates an already unwieldy reconstitution problem in that there are significant vulnerabilities to an effort to reconstitute modernized aircraft and crews with advanced skills..

For these reasons, future reconstitution is entirely dependent on decisions made to MPA force structure. If certain platform capability and crew core competencies are intended and envisioned, and a sufficient resource base is not maintained, the ability to sustain force levels or reconstitute will degenerate due to the absence of a sufficient nucleus of trained leadership, operator expertise, and modernized aircraft. It appears that the P-3 community is at that minimum state to meet present mission requirements and sustain a reconstitution capability. Present or near-term budget-driven decisions to cut the MPA community further would probably preclude meaningful, effective reconstitution.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

*"In the end, Americans will always do the right thing –
after having first exhausted all other alternatives."
– Winston Churchill*

The strategy of reconstitution was stated as part of the 1992 National Military Strategy. Whether stated or implied, as the United States seeks to leverage risk for future capabilities, reconstitution is essential regardless of how difficult it is to sustain over time or how the credibility and viability of reconstitution can be annulled through an expedient or careless program decision. Some of the hardest elements of reconstitution are well known:

"Timely reconstitution requires that we take care to preserve the longest-lead elements of our security. This includes particularly our alliance structures, forward deployments and access, and the technological and doctrinal edge that comes from vigorous innovation and development. This also includes particular weapon systems or capabilities that take a long time to rebuild, such as large weapons platforms that require long production of recommission times and highly skilled personnel, like unit commanders and specialized technicians. ...We recognize that to take major reconstitution measures would require major political decisions, potentially on the basis of early strategic warning indications. We will of course give increased attention to the intelligence and warning processes that would support such decision making, as

well as measures that will provide an early response while minimizing undue escalatory pressures."⁸⁶

These words of warning and wisdom have gone unheeded. For instance, this paper has shown that the multi-mission Maritime Patrol Aviation reconstitution capability has been placed at risk through expedient, short-sighted budget cutting decisions. Regardless of the present-day hardships placed upon MPA assets to meet expanding roles and missions, future reconstitution would be impossible if drastic force level cuts are effected like those proposed in 1994. Several areas of this analysis support this:

- An over-reliance on historical precedence can be misleading. To conclude from the American victory in 1945 and American military rearmament in 1952 that what was once ultimately successful will be again is to ignore sweeping changes in political, economic, and military structure. Additionally, even to label these examples as "successful" based on the ultimate outcome is debatable and assumes that losses up-front and early in each conflict are an inevitable part of future national security trade-offs.

- How one philosophically approaches the role of government, and the application of systems theory directly effects the efficacy of reconstitution. Reconstitution seems to be better served by a the constrained vision view that it is not itself the solution. Reconstitution requires systematic reinforcements that lead to consistent results even in light of opposing individual interests. This view would be one that learns from history, and applies inter-locking policy and processes on structure.

- The defense resource allocation process has several disconnects in it that act to frustrate or preclude reconstitution in the long run. The Joint Strategic Planning

⁸⁶Dick Cheney, "National Military Security," Defense 91, (March/April 1991): 11.

System and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems do not coalesce in areas where reconstitution would be reinforced. Both concentrate on near term force applications and work together to subjugate the acquisition system and reduce its attempts to sustain key industrial bases. Without an articulated strategy at the very top levels, it is probable that given the annual pressures placed on these systems, they each will succumb to more "ad-hoc" influences and lead to short-sighted results.

— The Maritime Patrol Aviation (MPA) case study highlights several of these conclusions. Though not in immediate danger of being unable to reconstitute due to the excess capacity remaining from the recent force reductions, MPA will rapidly lose key components after the year 2000. As a result, MPA could conceivably be unable to reconstitute by the year 2010.⁸⁷ As this is just one asset in the anti-submarine warfare 'tool bag,' the United States is in the immediate position of having to re-assess its national ASW capabilities versus the potential threat for its own long range strategic security.

Recommendations

• The strategy of reconstitution should be restated and affirmed in each of the key national security policy and guidance documents.

• Carefully placed reconstitution and policy links should be established within the JSPS, PPBS and acquisition systems. Each staff element of the Joint Chiefs should have a "reconstitution-awareness" cell that links key elements from the earliest drafts of the JSCP and DPG, to the final review process conducted by J-7.

⁸⁷Even contracts for new production aircraft may be futile as the P-3 reaches its maximum life and is rapidly retired. This coupled with training command limitations restricting an accelerated accessions process means decisions to reconstitute MPA will need to be made before year 2010.

These influences could force interactivity at lower levels and a recognized cross-dialogue with acquisition specialists. Other interdependent processes⁸⁸ could be co-created within the systems. But, without this infusion of coherent leadership and management oversight, the strategy of reconstitution will continue to erode as short-term priorities and thinking changes or forgets long range decisions.

The Department of Defense should continue to shift its force planning philosophical architecture toward the concept of "mission-pull" instead of scenario-based foundations. DoD should additionally loosen the link between global war and reconstitution. Instead of a base force centered on a scenario or capabilities for a scenario, planners should focus on missions likely to arise 18 to 20 years from now.⁸⁹ While planners may be uncertain as the where, when or who the U.S. might use force against, they can be much more focused on the how. Forces would then be sustained and capabilities maintained to address future threat environments, future missions, and critical tasks.

In conclusion, reconstitution must be a viable pillar, stated or implied, of the National Military Strategy. The military must recognize that it will have to reconstitute forces. Without the policy structure contained within the budgetary process and review at DoD, the strategy of reconstitution gets

⁸⁸Such as modification to JOPES and CONPLANS.

⁸⁹Carl A. Murdock, "Mission-Pull and Long-Range Planning," Joint Forces Quarterly, (Autumn-Winter 1994-95): 29-35.

lost among competing resources, short term solutions to difficult budgetary off-set solutions, and an understandable inability to achieve consensus on assessment of the future security environment and risk management.

The United States must be prepared to live with ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to the evolution of former adversaries and instability in its relations with allies. With sophisticated weapon systems and lengthy operator training requirements, it must avoid an over-reliance on rapid, total, or war-time mobilization to meet threats (something we have not done very well in the past). The primary problem for defense planners is not the freefall military forces, but a steady erosion of capabilities and assets due to the inexorable, unintended, marginal adjustments that blur priorities, mask real losses in capabilities, and quietly increase risk.

"It is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies...the circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite..."
— Alexander Hamilton

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